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Resumen: La evidencia empirica que se presenta en este trabajo pone en dud a la 
idea generalmente aceptada, de que los program as de estabilizacion del 
tipo de cambio son expansionistas. Aunque estos program,,, fueron aso-
ciadas a expansiones macroeconolnicas, no se encontro ninguna cviden-
cia que estas hayan sido causadas por ellos. Se encontro quc, aparente-
mente, ambos fueron el resultado de choques externos y positivos. 
Abstract: The empirical evidence presented in this paper casts doubts on the by 
now widely accepted "fact"that exchange rate based stabilization pro-
grams are expansionary. Even though these programs were associated 
with output booms, no evidence was found to support the thesis that 
the booms were caused by the stabilization programs. Rather, positive 
external shocks seem to have caused both the output booms and the 
stabilization programs. 
1. Introduction 
Not long ago, conventional macroeconomic wisdom taught that price 
stabilization programs cause an initial slowdown in the rate of growth 
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of output, due to rigidities in nominal contracts (Fischer, 1988; Tay-
lor 1980, among others). III recent years, this traditional view has 
beel! challenged. A large number of case studies and several com-
parative studies have concluded that stabilization programs that use 
the exchange rate as the nominal anchor to reduce high levels of iTl~ 
flation are initially expansionary rather than contradionary (1< iguel 
and Liviatan, 1992; Vcgh, 1992; Reinhart and Vcgh, 1991; and Rein~ 
hart and Vcgh, 1995; among others). According to this literature, 
exchange rate based stabilization, ERBS, programs cause an initial 
"boom", followed by a recession. In this view, only the programs that 
use the quantity of money as the nominal anchor exhibit recessiollS 
from the very beginning. 8asterly (1996) went further in the revi-
sion of the stylized facts associated with the stabilization programs. 
He presents evidence in support of the proposition that stabili:;r,ation 
programs are always expansionary, not only in their initial phase. 
The empirical proposition that price stabilization programs have 
systematic real effects - including real appreciation of the domestic 
currency, current account deficits and output cycles - stilllulated the 
theoretical research. As a result, there is a growing theoretical lit~ 
erature aimed at identifying the mechanisms behind these "stylized 
facts" (Calvo, 1986; Helpman and Razin, 1987; Calvo and V egh, 199:~; 
Holdos 1995a and b; Uribe, 1995; among others). 
The purpose of the present paper is to challenge the empirical 
proposition that ERBS programs have been expansionary. Using data 
from Latin American countries, we have found J10 evidence of output 
booms caused by the ERBS programs. Rather, external shocks explain 
the output booms that have been ascribed to the stabilizatioll pro-
grams in previous studies. 111 additioJl, we pH'sent (~vidence t hat the 
EIU3S programs were to SOllIe extent an endogenous response to the cx~ 
ternal shocks. Other things equal, Latin A meric<ln governmcnts seem 
to have been more willing to launch F,;rws programs when external 
conditions were relatively more favorable, and hence the c()incidencf~ 
of booms and stabilization programs. 
Most of the clllpirieal evidence that has been presented to sup-
port the proposition that the ERRS programs have been initially ex-
pansionary refers to Latin America. Therefore, it seems appropriate 
to focus on the same region to revise this hypothesis. F'urthennore, 
there is no other region in the world that has experienced two and 
three digit allllual rates of inflation for more than three decades. Sta-
bilization policies have been at the top of the policy agenda in Latin 
America throughout this period, and several cOlllprehellsive stabiliza-
tioll programs have been illlplemented. lIenee, the regioll exhibits the 
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policy variability that is necessary to identify statistical relationships. 
At the same time, even though Latin American countries are not ho-
mogeneous, they have often been subject to similar external shocks. 
This helps to control for other sources of variation when evaluating 
the effects of the stabilization policies. 
The identification of the episodes that should be classified as sta-
bilization programs is not always clear. Indeed, deciding when a pro-
gram is actually in place, when it starts and when it finishes involves 
some degree of discretion. Easterly (1996) has recently emphasized 
this point, arguing that the recession-now-versus recession-later hy-
pothesis fails to hold if the stabilization programs are identified using 
objective criteria based 011 inflation performance. He propose;:; an ob-
jective criterion for the selection of the stabilization episodes: inflation 
of over forty percent for two years or more followed by a period of two 
years or more of inflation below forty percent. Using this criterion, 
Ea;:;terlY identifies 28 stabilization episodes in the 1960-1994 period, 
all over the world. He then shows that no recessions were associated 
with these episodes, the pattern being the same for exchange-rate 
based and money-based stabilization programs. 
Even though the idea of using an objective criterion to date the 
stabilization programs is appealing, Easterly's procedure and the re-
;:;ults obtained are highly controversial. Above all, there seems to 
be a contradiction in defining the programs according to their re-
sults (the inflation rate) in order to analyze their results. There are 
episodes in which inflation went down mainly because of favorable 
external shocks, without the government having implemented a spe-
cific stabilization policy. There are also major stabilization attempts 
that failed to reduce inflation. This methodology biases the selection 
against unsuccessful programs. lIcnce, it is not surprising that the 
list of stabilization programs that emerges from Easterly'S algorithm 
is controversial. For instance, only one stabilization program is found 
in A rgentina in the period ] 9()Q-1994. Also, among many attempts 
in the Southern cone to control inflation via the use of tablitas, only 
the Uruguayan olle appears in this list. So, while the point raised by 
Easterly cannot be dismissed, the proposed solution for identifying 
episodes looks worse than the problem it was designed to solve. 
Empirical studies of the business cycles associated with the EFWS 
programs face serious problems when trying to identity the relevant 
episodes. Whatever the merits of Easterly's ;:;olution, the questions he 
raises about the criteria for selecting stabilization epi;:;ode;:; canllot be 
dismissed. Nevertheless, this paper pursues a different line of criticism 
of this literature, namely that the boom hypothe;:;is may not be robust 
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to the inclusion of some additional controls. To this end, it seems 
natural to stick to the "conventional" list of stabilization programs 
(Reinhart and Vegh, 1994, 1995). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
presents a probit model for the ERGS programs. The analysis of the 
effects of the programs on GDP growth is presented in section 3. Sec-
tion 4 ends the paper with some concluding remarks. 
2. Major Price Stabilization Programs in Latin America 
The set of programs used in all estimations was taken from Reinhart 
and Vegh (1995), with the exception of the Brazilian "Plan Real", 
which was not included in their sample. The main characteristics of 
these programs are summarized in table 1. 
Following previous literature, only major programs that the pub-
lic could clearly identify have been included. As Calvo and V {~gh 
(1998) have pointed out, this approach has the disadvantage of be-
ing subjective and omitting lesser-known episodes. But, at the same 
time they note that "it makes sense to select episodes in which the 
phenomenon in question - relative to many other factors which are 
difficult to control for - was of overriding importance." 
The focus is on disinflation programs in chronic inflation coun-
tries. As Pazos (1972) first noticed, chronic inflation is a different 
phenomenon from both low inflation and hyperinflation. The hy-
pothesis that ERBS programs cause output booms refers specifically 
to countries experiencing chronic inflation. Stabilizing from low in-
flation apparently causes recessions (Ball, 1994, Gordon, 1982), while 
stabilizing from hyperinflation may have no effects on out put (Sar-
gent, 1982). These considerations have some bearing on the choice 
of the disinflation episodes that are included in the sample. For in-
stance, the Bolivian experience in the mid-eighties is not included, 
since it is not a stabilization-from-chronic-inflation program (Calvo 
and Vegh, 1998). 
Six dummies were defined to identify different phases of the sta-
bilization programs in the regression analysis (table 2). El takes 
value one in the first year of an ERBS program and zero otherwise. A 
calendar year was considered to be the first year of the program if the 
program started in allY month from July of the immediate previous 
year to June of that calendar year. This mapping of the calendar 
into program years is intended to proxy the first twelve months of the 
programs using annual data. E2 and E3 take value one in the second 
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and third years of an ERBS program, respectively, provided the pro-
gram did not end before. E4 takes value one in the fourth and fifth 
years of an ERBS program, provided it did not end before. Most 
ERBS programs failed, and thus have an identifiable final date (see 
table 1). It is more difficult to identify the end of a successful pro-
gram. Previous literature suggests that the late recessions in ERBS 
programs tend to show up around the fourth and fifth years (Rein-
hart and Vegh, 1995). ME, for "money early", is equal to one in 
the first year and, M L, for "money late", is equal to one in the last 
year of a money-based stabilization program. In the case of successful 
programs, M L is equal to one in the fifth year of the program. These 
conventions are taken from Reinhart and Vegh (1994). 
Arguably, the program dummies could have been defined differ-
ently. Different months could have been chosen to map the calendar 
into the program years. Calvo and Vegh (1998), for instance, con-
sider that a program started in year t if it was launched in any of 
the first three quarters of the year, rather than in the first two as 
we did. Also, there is no clear-cut criterion to say when programs 
enter their "late" phase. The choice of the fourth and fifth years of 
an ERBS program and the fifth year of a money-based stabilization 
program to capture the performance of mature programs is also more 
an empirical issue than a matter of principles. Our results are robust 
to reasonable variations in the definitions of the dummy variables. 1 
3. Explaining the ERBS Programs 
Given the high rates of inflation that many countries in Latin Amer-
ica exhibited from the sixties to the nineties, it is not surprising that 
several major stabilization programs were implemented in the region 
during this period. What is less obvious is that regional shocks af-
fected the decision to launch such programs. The ERBS programs in 
Latin America were implemented more-or-less simultaneously in sev-
eral countries. A batch of plans were implemented in the mid sixties, 
the tablitas in the late seventies, the "heterodox" plans in the mid 
eighties and then the plans of the late eighties and first half of the 
nineties. Not only were the programs often launched at the senne 
time in different countries, they were also abandoned at the same 
time. Apart from contagion effects, this suggests that the stabiliza-
tion programs were endogenous responses to a set of determinants 
common to various countries in the region. The analysis that follows 
makes this point more formally. 
1 To save space, we discuss only the results of the regression analysis obtained 
with the dummies reported in table 2, but other estimations are available upon 
request. 
Programs 
Brazil 1964 
Argentina 1967 
Uruguay 1968 
Argentine 
tablita 
Chilean 
tablita 
Uruguayan 
tablita 
Austral 
(Argentina) 
Cruzado 
(Brazil) 
Table 1 
Major Price Stabilization Programs in Latin America 
A) Exchange Rate Based Stabilization Programs 
Inflation Rate 1/ 
Beginning and Exchange Rate 
Initial Lowest Data Ending Dates Arrangement 2/ 3/ achieved 
1964:03-1968:08 Fixed exchange rate, 93.6 18.9 1968:05 
with periodic devaluations 
1967:03-1970:05 Fixed exchange rate 26.4 5.7 1969:02 
1968:06-1981:02 Fixed exchange rate 182.9 9.5 1969:06 
1978: 12-1981 :02 Pre-announced crawling peg 169.9 81.6 1981:02 
1978:02-1982:06 1978:02-1979:06: Pre-announ- 52.1 3.7 1982:05 
ced crawling peg 
1979:06-1982:06: fixed 
exchange rate 
1978:10-1982:11 Pre-announced crawling peg 41.2 11.0 1982:11 
1985:06-1986:09 1985:06-1986:03: fixed rate 1128.9 50.1 1986:06 
1986:03-1986:09: crawling peg 
1986:02-1986: 11 Fixed exchange rate 286.0 76.2 1986: 11 
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Table l(continued) 
Programs Beginning and Exchange Rate 
Ending Dates Arrangement 
Mexico 1987 1987: 12-1994: 12 1988:02-1988: 12: fixed 
exchange rate 4/ 
Argentina 1991 1991:04-present Currency board with a one-to-
one parity to the U.S. dollar 
Uruguay 1990 1990: 12-present Exchange rate band with a 
declining rate of devaluation 
Brazil 1994 1994:04-1999:01 Fixed exchange rate 
InflationRate 1/ 
Initial Lowest Data. 
2/ 3/ achieved 
159.0 6.7 1994:09 
267.0 -0.6 1999:03 
133.7 7.2 1999:03 
3828.5 1.7 1999:01 
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Programs 
Chile 1975 
Bonex 
(Argentina) 
Collor 
(Brazil) 
Table 1 (continued) 
B) Money-based Stabilization Programs 
Inflation Rate 1/ 
Beginning and M onetary/ Exchange Initial Lowest Data Ending Dates Rate Policy 2/ 3/ achieved 
1975:04-1977: 12 Control of monetary 394.3 63.4 1977:12 
aggregates was cornerstone. 
Exchange rate adjusted 
by past inflation 5/ 
1989: 12-1991 :02 Drastic cut in liquidity 4923.3 287.3 1991:02 
through forced rescheduling 
of domestic debt. 
Floating exchange rate. 
1990:03-1991:01 Sharp liquidity squeeze 5747.3 1119.5 1991:01 
through freeze of 70% 
of financial assets. 
Tight monetary policy. 
Exchange rate had a 
passive role and simply 
accommodated inflation. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Inflation Rate 1/ 
Programs Beginning and Monetary / Exchange Initial Ending Dates Rate Policy 2/ 
Dominican 1990:08-present 1990:08-1990:12: Exchange 60.0 
Republic controls/black markets 
1991:01-1991:07: dual 
exchange rates 
1991:07: exchange market 
unification and floating 
Peru 1990:08-present Control of monetary 12377.8 
aggegates; dirty floating 
----
1/ Twelve-month inflation rate 
2/ Twelve-month inflation rate in the month in which the program was implemented. 
3/ Last information available: March 1999. 
Lowest Data 
3/ achieved 
0.8 1992:03 
4.1 1999:02 
4/ The exchange rate fixing followed some initial devaluations between December 15 and February 29, 1988. 
5/ Significant measures toward lifting capital controls enacted only in June 1979 (Edwards and Cox Edwards, 1991) 
Source: Calvo and Vegh (1998), press and data from International Financial Statistics (IMF). 
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Countries 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
Dominican 
Republic 
Mexico 
Peru 
Uruguay 
Table 2 
Stabilization Program Dummies 
Observations in which the dummies are equal to 1 
E1 E2 E3 E4 
1967, 1979 1968, 1980 1969, 1981 1970, 1994 
1985, 1991 1986, 1992 1993 1995 
1964, 1986 1965, 1995 1966, 1996 1967, 1968 
1994 
1978 1979 1980 1981, 1982 
1988 1989 1990 1991, 1992 
1968, 1979 1969, 1980 1970, 1981 1971, 1972 
1991 1992 1993 1982, 1994 
1995 
Source: elaborated by the authors based on table 1. 
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A probit model was estimated using panel data for the Latin Ameri-
can countries that implemented ERBS programs during the past three 
decades. The dependent variable is the dummy E 1, wich takes value 
one, if an ERBS program started in the country in that year, and zero 
otherwise. The domestic explanatory variables are the lagged loga-
rithm of the rate of inflation, LP 1, the lagged logarithm of the ratio of 
international reserves to GDP, LI R, and a dummy for parliamentary 
electiolls, PARELE, lagged two periods. The foreign explanatory 
variables are the percent increase in us stock prices, represented by 
Standard and Poors 500 Index, 8 P500, and the rate of growth of GOP 
in industrial countries, IGDPG (see the appendix for a description 
of the data). The results are reported in table 3. 
The coefficients are statistically significant at five percent at 
least, and exhibit the "right" signs. As to the domestic determi-
nants, ERBS programs are more likely to be launched when inflation 
in the previous year was larger, when foreign reserves were higher, 
and in the second year after parliamentary elections. The first result 
is natural, robust and self explanatory. The finding that larger for-
eign reserves favored the launching of an ERBS program is consistent 
with the fact that fixed exchange-rate regimes require a high level of 
reserves. The third seems to indicate that politicians are more willing 
to launch an ERBS program during the early phases of the legislative 
session. 2 
Both the rate of growth of GDP in industrial countries and the 
return on us stocks, as measured by the rate of growth of S P500, are 
positively associated with the beginning of ERBS programs in Latin 
America. The qualitative results are robust to changes in the sample. 
The relationship between several us interest rates and ERBS programs 
were also tested, but were either not significant or not robust to small 
changes in the sample. 
These results seem to confirm that, other things equal, policy-
makers were more willing to launch ERBS programs when the inter-
national environment was relatively more favorable. Table 3 provides 
some support to the optimal waiting theory, according to which gov-
ernments wait until conditions are relatively good to initiate a sta-
bilization program (Orphanides, 1996). It does not mean, of course, 
that only when facing good external conditions did Latin American 
governments start a stabilization program: several domestic variables 
also proved important in the decision. Our result is indeed consistent 
with the launching of some stabilization programs under unfavorable 
2 This interpretation is very tentative. Military governments implemented 
some of the analyzed programs, the lenght of parliamentary sessions varies from 
one country to another, and the political costs of the programs could also be very 
different in different circumstances. Nevertheless, the coefficients multiplying the 
other regressors do not vary significantly if this variable is omitted. 
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external conditions, as was the case of the Argentinian A ustral plan 
in 1985. The external conditions were very negative for Argentina at 
that time, but an inflationary process that was running out of control 
left the government with few options (Canavese and Di Tella 1988). 
Variables 
LPli,t-l 
LI R i ,t-2 
PARELEi ,t-2 
Table 3 
Pro bit Model 
Dependent variable: E li,t 
Estimate Error 
0.615 0.166 
0.551 0.269 
0.945 0.417 
SP500 t - SP500t - 1 2.559 1.198 
IGDPG t 40.874 16.777 
Constant 3.366 4.193 
Number of observations 
Number of positive observations 
t P 
statistic value 
3.704 ** [.000] 
2.045 * [.041J 
2.267 * [.023] 
2.137 * [.033] 
2.436 * [.015] 
0.803 [.422] 
160 
12 
Pseudo R Squared (Cragg and Uhler, 1970) a/ 0.388 
Pseudo R Squared (Mc Fadden, 1974) a/ 0.328 
Notes: Penod of estnnatlOn: 1963 to 1994. Countnes: Argentma, 
Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay. a/ See Maddala (1983). Sources: 
see the appendix. 
4. The Stabilization Programs and the Business Cycle 
The purpose of this section is to review the empirical evidence on the 
business cycle associated with the ERBS programs in the light of the 
evidence presented in the previous section, that the ERBS programs 
were mostly launched under favorable external conditions. 
Reinhart and Vegh (1994) submit the stabilization-programs-
business-cycle hypothesis to statistical scrutiny, using data from Latin 
America during the last three decades (1964-1993). They perform re-
gression analysis with panel data on the seven Latin American coun-
tries that implemented stabilization programs in the period. The rate 
of growth of real GOP is the dependent variable and several dummies 
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are designed to capture different stages of the stabilization programs. 
One such regression is reported in column 1 in table 4. 3 
We detected some extreme values in our dataset that significantly 
affected the results. According to the IMP, Brazilian real GOP grew 
at a rate of 23 per cent during 1965, the second year of the 1964 
EBBS program. In order to avoid having the results distorted by this 
extreme observation, the Brazilian 1964 program was excluded from 
the sample. Hence, the analysis that follows is based on the five 
money-based and eleven of the twelve exchange-rate-based stabiliza-
tion programs implemented in Latin America since 1964. 
The Reinhart-V egh-like regression reproduces very well the styl-
ized business cycle that has been ascribed to the stabilization pro-
grams. In particular, an early boom followed by a recession is found 
in the ERBS programs, while money-based stabilization programs are 
associated with recessions from the very beginning. 
However, the probit model shows that the initiation of the ERBS 
programs is associated with particular circumstances that are likely to 
have an independent influence on growth. Hence, there is a potential 
selection bias in regression 1 of table 4, produced by the statistical 
association between the program dummies and the explanatory vari-
ables in our probit modeL 
The second regression in table 4 controls for stock prices in the 
United States and GOP growth in industrial countries, both lagged one 
period, and for lagged domestic GOP growth. The first two regressors 
proved important in explaining the launching of ERBS programs, and 
are hence potential sources of bias if omitted. The inclusion of lagged 
GOP growth in the regression should improve the efficiency of the 
estimation. 
The estimated coefficient associated with the second year of an 
ERBS program is much lower once these additional variables are ill-
cluded, and not significantly different from zero (at a 10 percent of 
confidence). Note that the rate of GDP growth of industrial countries, 
and the percent increase of us stock prices, explains a significant part 
of current GDP growth in Latin American countries. Apparently, at 
least part of the output booms observed in the region at the begin-
ning of the ERBS programs could actually be ascribed to the external 
factors. 
3 The dummy variables used in this regression and defined in section 2 are 
not exactly the Reinhart- Vegh dummies. They included just two dummies for 
the ERBS programs, one for the first, "exchange early" and one for the last year, 
"exchange late", Adding the other two renders the estimation more robust, and 
especially increases the ability of the regression to capture the output booms, for 
some of these booms became visible during the second calendar year after the 
initiation of the ERBS programs 
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Table 4 
Real GD? Growth 
Seven Latin American Countries, 1964-1995 
Variables (1) (2) 
E1 0.006 0.005 
(0.341) (0.353) 
E2 0.029 * 0.024 
(1.786) (1.512) 
E3t 0.007 -0.002 
(0.:~7 4) (-0.126) 
E4 t 0.031 ** -0.032 ** 
( -2.059) (-2. U8) 
MEt 
-0.068 * * * -0.017 * * * 
(-3.058) (-2.121) 
MLt 0.021 0.025 
(0.904) (1.117) 
SP500t - 1 -- 0.039 * 
(1.640) 
IGDPGt-l - 0_3:1O 
(1.7:m) 
GDPGt _ 1 0.255 * * * 
(3.698) 
Adj. R2 0.033 0.105 
Noles. t values in parentheses. One, lwo and three 
slars indicate significance at 10, 5 and J per cent, respec·· 
tively- Fixed Effects eslimations. Sources: see the appendix 
In order to check the robustness of our results, we performed a 
sensitivity analysis along the lines of Leamer (1985), and Levine and 
Renelt (1995). The sellsitivity of the estimations of the efrects of the 
programs is analyzed running regressions that include the program 
dummies, the lagged endogenous variable, and varying sets of con-
trols. The cOlltrol variables are organized into two subsets_ The first 
incl udes the rate of growth of S P500, the Federal Reserve discollnt 
rate, DlS'C, the Federal Funds rate FF, the Treasury Bills rate, 1'13, 
the Prinw Rate, P R, and the rate of ri'turll on US government :~ -
STABILIZATION PROGRAMS 79 
year bonds C If. These variables are expected to capture external-
to-the-region conditions which affect capital flows to Latin America 
(Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart, 1992 and 1993). The second subset 
of controls includes industrial countries' GDP growth I CD PC, indus-
trial countries' investment-GOP ratio I I N V, and the percent change 
in the terms of trade of each country TOT. We started estimating 
all the combinations of these two subsets, taking one control variable 
frortl each subset and lagging them one period. Then, we estimated 
the same combinations using the contemporaneous and lagged values 
of the controls (except for the TOT where we used a one and a two 
year lag, avoiding the contemporaneous value). Thus, we rail :16 dif-
ferent combinations for each estimation method (fixed and randolIl 
effects). 
Table 5 summarizes the information from the regressions yielding 
the highest and lowest t-value for the parameter of interest. "Base" re-
fers to the regression without controls. The Hausman test systemat-
ically rejected the hypothesis of correlation between the individual 
effects and the regressors, so the random effects-estimations should 
be consistent and more efficient than the fixed-effects estimations. 
Nevertheless, since the test has low power in small samples both es-
timations are reported. 
The E2 coefficient is positive in all the regressions, but it is 1101, 
robust. Some sets of controls yielded a positive and significant co-
efficient for this dummy, at least when fixed- effects estimation is 
chosen, but other plausible controls render this coefficient non signif-
icant. 4 It is not surprising that some sets of controls do not modify 
the estimation of this coefficient. If our "story" is right, these con-
trols should capture the common external shocks that simultaneously 
affect the business cycle and the economic policy. This is a complex 
phenomenon that we can expect to capture only imperfectly, and it 
seems natural that some sets of controls work better than others. 
Hence, even though there seems to be larger than average rat<~s of 
growth at the beginning of the ERBS programs, it is ]jot possible to 
say that these rates of growth are really larger than expected, given 
previous growth and external shocks. The E4 coefficient is always 
negative, with a lowest t-value of L84G, corresponding to a V-value 
4 Calvo and Vcgh (1998) have recently reported results of regressiolls ill which 
the early booms remain after including some controls for external shocks. VVe ob-
tain silnilar results when we choose regressors, sB:.!nplcs, and Incthods of cstilllatioll 
similar to theirs. However, tables 2 and :l show th"t these results are llot rubust. 
Variable Extremes Coeff 
E1 High 0.010 
Base 0.006 
Low 0.004 
E2 High 0.034 
Base 0.029 
Low 0.023 
E3 High 0.008 
Base 0.007 
Low 0.000 
Table 5 
Sensitivity Analysis 
A) Fixed Effects 
Standard t 
Error 
0.016 0.630 
0.016 0.342 
O.OlS 0.2S0 
0.016 2.092 
0.017 1. 768 
0.016 1.462 
0.018 0.482 
0.018 0.370 
0.018 0.012 
Adj - R2 
0.12S 
0.033 
0.146 
0.132 
0.033 
0.146 
0.163 
0.033 
0.146 
Controls 
TOTt _ 1 TOTt -2 
SPSOO t SPSOO t - 1 
IGDPG t IGDPG t _ 1 
FFt F Ft - 1 
IGDPG t IGDPG t _ 1 
SPSOO t SPSOO t - 1 
IGDPG t IGDPGt _ 1 
FFt FFt - 1 
IINVt - 1 PRIM E t - 1 
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FFt F Ft - 1 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Variable Extremes Coe! ! Standard t 
Error 
E4 High -0.037 0.015 -2.454 
Base -0.031 0.015 -2.039 
Low -0.027 0.015 -1.846 
ME High -0.053 0.021 -2.499 
Base -0.068 0.022 -3.045 
Low -0.041 0.022 -1.816 
ML High 0.034 0.022 1.507 
Base 0.020 0.023 0.874 
Low 0.012 0.022 0.535 
- -
Adj - R2 
0.092 
0.033 
0.163 
0.157 
0.033 
0.130 
0.132 
0.033 
0.146 
-
-_ .. --
Controls 
TOTt- 1 SP500t_ 1 
II NVt- 1 PRIM Et-l 
I INVt- 1 GBt- 1 
S P500t S P500t _ 1 
I INVt I INVt _ 1 
IGDPG t IGDPG t - 1 
SP500t SP500t- 1 
IGDPG t IGDPG t - 1 
FFt F F t - 1 
(f) 
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:::: 
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N 
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Z 
'"0 
;:0 
o 
C) 
;:0 
> ;:: 
(f) 
00 
Variable Extremes Coel I 
E1 High 0.007 
Base -0.000 
Low -0.000 
E2 High 0.029 
Base 0.023 
Low 0.018 
E3 High -0.013 
Base -0.001 
Low 0.000 
Table 5 (continued) 
B )Random Effects 
Standard t 
Error 
0.015 0.454 
0.016 -0.003 
0.015 -0.008 
0.015 1.929 
0.016 1.415 
0.015 1.226 
0.017 -0.788 
0.018 -0.040 
0.017 -0.001 
Adj - R2 Controls 
0.137 TOTt-l TOTt-2 
S P500 t S P500t _ 1 
0.033 
0.172 TOTt-l PRIM E t- 1 , 
0.142 IGDPG t IGDPG t_ 1 
SP500t SP500 t _ 1 
: 0.033 
0.180 IGDPG t IGDPG t _ 1 
PRIM E t PRIM E t- 1 ' 
0.137 TOTt- 1 TOTt - 2 
SP500 t SP500 t _ 1 
0.033 
0.153 IGDPG t_ 1 TB t- 1 
00 
~ 
t'l 
Ul 
>-3 
c: 
o (3 
Ul 
t'l 
o 
o 
z 
o· 
~ 
o 
o 
Ul 
Table 5 (continued) 
Variable Extremes Coef f Standard t 
Error 
E4 High -0.040 0.014 -2.901 
Base -0.038 0.015 -2.529 
Low -0.034 0.014 -2.444 
ME High -0.051 0.021 -2.430 
Base -0.068 0.022 -3.044 
Low -0.039 0.021 -1.841 
ML High 0.035 0.021 1.637 
Base 0.023 0.023 0.986 
Low 0.013 0.021 0.611 
--_._-
--
Notes: See the appendix for the sources and the list of variables. 
Adj - R2 Controls 
0.108 TOTt-l SP500 t - 1 
0.033 
0.142 IGDPG t IGDPG t _ 1 
S P500 t S P500 t- 1 
0.132 DISCt _ 1 IINVt-l, 
0.033 
0.141 S P500 t S P500 t _ 1 
IINVt IINVt- 1 
0.142 IGDPG t IGDPG t- 1 
SP500t SP500t _l 
0.033 
0.155 IGDPG t IGDPG t - 1 
F Ft F Ft- 1 
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of 0.067. The negative ME coefficient is robust in this set of regres-
sions. In summary, recessions are generally more robust than booms 
in this analysis. 5 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The empirical evidence presented in this paper casts serious doubts 
on the by now widely accepted "fact" that ERBS programs are ex·· 
pansionary. It was shown that previous comparative studies lacked 
appropriate controls, and thus overestimated the positive effects of 
the stabilization policies on output. No significant positive effects of 
the ERBS programs were found when other variables that capture the 
external shocks were included, while the recessions remained. 
A related "fact", that has been largely neglected in the liter-
ature, is that, other things equal, an ERBS program is more likely 
to be launched when the region faces favorable external conditions. 
Some recent theoretical literature provides plausible explanations of 
this link (Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Casella and Eichengreen, 1994; 
and Orphanides, 1996). It is precisely this "fact" that explains the 
overestimation of the effects of the stabilization programs in previous 
empirical studies.6 
At the very least, the analysis in this paper suggests that the 
evidence that the booms were caused by the stabilization programs 
should be carefully reassessed. Even if, after some more empirical 
research, it is found that the ERBS programs can have some positive 
independent effects on output, the order of magnitude of those effects 
is likely to be significantly smaller than what has been assumed so 
far. 
It is interesting to note, in this respect, that recent attempts 
to calibrate models of the real effects of stabilization programs have 
5 We estimated a set of regressions with country-standardized series to elimi-
nate country-wise heteroscedasticity. The results are qualitatively the same. We 
prefer to present the estimations with the original variables, because point esti-
mates on the effects of the plans do not have a simple interpretation with stan-
dardized series. Other results are available upon request. 
6 It should be mentioned here that Kiguel and Liviatan (1992) have already 
noticed that most ERBS programs were initiated under favorable external condi-
tions. Also Simonsen (1988) and Ortiz (1988) identified external conditions that 
were favorable to Brazil when the Cruzado program was launched. A similar point 
was made by Bruno and Piterman (1988) and by Cukierman (1988) for the 1985 
Israeli stabilization program. However, somehow surprisingly, these observations 
seem not to have been applied to analysis of the "stylized facts" associated with 
the ERE S programs. 
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failed to obtain the high rates of growth observed during the ERBS 
programs (Rei.nhart and Vegh, 1994; Rebelo and Vegh, 1995). The 
results of this paper might help to explain those failures in a simple 
way: the models cannot reproduce such booms simply because they 
were not caused by the stabilization programs. Thus, maybe the mod· 
els are basically correct when they predict at most modest increases 
in production and consumption associated with implementation of 
stabilization policies. 
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Appendix 
Data 
DISCt United States discount rate. Source: IF'S of 1MF'. 
EL,t Dummy variable that takes value 1 during year I"~ 
if country i started an ERGS program from july of 
year t-I to june of year t, and 0 otherwise. (See the 
dating of the programs in table AI). 
E2i,t Dummy variable that takes value I during year t, if 
country i is in the second year of an ERGS program, 
and 0 otherwise (analogous for E3i,t). 
E4i,t Dummy variable that takes value I during year t, 
if country i is in the fourth or following years of an 
ERBS program, and 0 otherwise. 
FPt United States federal funds rate. Source: LFS of 
IMF. 
GEt United States government bonds, 3 years maturity. 
Source: IFS of IMF. 
GDPGi,t Rate of growth of real GOP in country i during year 
t. Source: IF'S of IMF. 
IGDPG t Industrial countries' GOP growth. Source: IFS of 
1MF'. 
IINVt Industrial countries' investment to GOP ratio. 
Source: IF'S of 1MF'. 
--
LIR,t Logarithm of the ratio of nominal reserves to 
nominal GOP for country i at the end of year t. 
Source: IF'S of IMP. 
LPIi,t Logarithm of inflation in country i during year t. 
Source: IPS of IMP. 
-
ME;,t Dummy variable that takes value I during year t, 
if country i is in the first year of a money based 
stabilization program, and 0 otherwise. 
MLi,t Dummy variable that takes value I during year t, 
if country i is in the last year of a money based 
stabilization program, and 0 otherwise. 
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Data (continued) 
PARELEi,t Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the country 
i had a parliamentary election during year t, and 
o otherwise. Source: International Foundation for 
Election Systems, Washington DC. 
PRt Prime rate. Source: IFS of IMF. 
SP500t First difference of the logarithm of the Standard 
and Poors 500 stock index. Source: Global 
Financial Data, Stock Market Indexes. 
TEt Treasury Bill rate. Source: IFS of IMF. 
TOTi,t Percent change in the terms of trade for country i 
during year t. Source: ECLAC. 
Table Al 
Major Price Stabilization Programs in Latin America 
Exchange Rate Based Stabilization Programs 
Brazil 1964 1964:03-1968:08 
Argentina 1967 1967:03-1970:10 
Uruguay 1968 1968:06-1971:12 
Argentine tablita 1978:12-1981:02 
Chilean tablita 1978:02-1982: 06 
Uruguayan tablita 1978:10-1982:10 
Austral (Argentina) 1985:06-1986:09 
Cruzado (Brazil) 1986: 02-1986: 11 
Mexico 1987 1987:12-1992:02 
Convertibility Program 1991:04-present 
( Argentina) 
Uruguay 1991 1991:0l-present 
Brazil 1994 1994:04-present 
STABILIZATION PROGRAMS 89 
Table A 1 (continued) 
Money-based Stabilization Programs 
Chile 1975 
Bonex (Argentina) 
Collor (Brazil) 
Dominican Republic 
1975:04-1977: 12 
1989: 12-1991 :01 
1990:03-1991:01 
1990:08-prescnt 
Peru 1990:08-prescnt 
Source: Remhart and Vegh (1994), save for Brazil 1994 
that was added later. 
